Comparative Lessons on Decentralisation, Peace & Democracy
The Architecture of Autonomy: How Decentralisation Supports Peace and Democracy
In the countries examined here, decentralisation has supported peace and democratic stability by accommodating territorial, linguistic, religious, political, and economic diversity within a shared system of governance. Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States developed distinct systems of federalism or devolution in response to specific historical tensions. These included ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions, competing national identities, regional demands for self-government, economic and fiscal interests, distrust of centralised authority, and the need to prevent the concentration of power under authoritarian rule.
By giving regions meaningful authority while preserving common national institutions, these arrangements have created democratic channels for resolving disputes that might otherwise become zero-sum struggles over control of the state. Their experience shows how self-rule and shared rule can make political unity compatible with diversity, representation, and peaceful contestation, while also laying the foundations for progressive democratic institutions.
Distinct Models of Territorial Governance
Switzerland combines federalism, strong cantonal and municipal authority, and extensive direct democracy. Its 1848 federal settlement followed the Sonderbund War between Catholic and Protestant cantons and created a stronger common state while retaining important cantonal autonomy. Cantonal representation in federal institutions and the double-majority requirement for constitutional amendments have helped protect territorially concentrated minorities, especially across linguistic and religious divisions.
Spain is formally a unitary state but has developed extensive regional self-government through the post-1978 State of Autonomies. Its asymmetric framework accommodates historically distinct communities, notably the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia, while preserving a single Spanish sovereignty. Basque autonomy is especially extensive, including the Concierto Económico fiscal arrangement and a regional police force. These institutions widened democratic channels for territorial demands after Francoism, although they did not independently end ETA’s armed campaign and have not resolved conflict over Catalan self-determination.
Canada is a federation in which provinces possess substantial constitutional authority over areas such as education, health administration, property and civil rights, and natural-resource management. This framework has enabled Quebec to preserve French-language institutions and its civil-law tradition within Canada. Federalism has helped manage Quebec sovereignty claims through elections, referendums, and constitutional debate, though it has not ended disputes over Quebec’s political status.
The United States is a federal system in which states retain significant constitutionally protected authority while remaining subject to the federal Constitution and federal law. Federalism helped unite former colonies that were wary of concentrated central authority. State governments continue to provide regional representation and opportunities for policy experimentation. However, American federalism has also generated conflicts over rights and inequality. It has also produced ongoing tensions over the distribution of power between the federal and state governments.
Germany is a constitutional federation in which the Länder participate in federal legislation through the Bundesrat. Federalism was entrenched after the Second World War as part of a wider constitutional settlement intended to disperse power and prevent renewed authoritarian centralisation. Germany’s cooperative federal system requires continual negotiation between federal and Länder governments, combining common national standards with strong regional participation in their formation and implementation.
The United Kingdom is a legally unitary state with asymmetric devolution. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have different legislative and executive powers, while Westminster retains parliamentary sovereignty. In Northern Ireland, devolved power-sharing is a central element of the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Alongside consent, British-Irish cooperation, North-South institutions, and rights protections, devolved government has provided a framework for managing unionist-nationalist conflict through democratic politics rather than violence.
Decentralisation as Conflict Management
Decentralisation has enabled territorially concentrated communities to protect important aspects of public life without needing to secure permanent control of the national government. It can therefore reduce the winner-takes-all character of centralised politics.
In Switzerland, federalism transformed a conflict between Catholic and Protestant cantons into a constitutional framework that balanced national unity with cantonal self-government. In Canada, provincial powers and Quebec’s distinct linguistic and legal institutions have contained sovereignty claims within democratic processes. In Spain, regional autonomy created representative institutions through which Basque and Catalan demands could be expressed, even though major constitutional and political disagreements remain. In Northern Ireland, power-sharing devolution has offered unionist and nationalist parties a structured means of sharing authority within a wider peace settlement.
The German and American cases show a related but distinct function: territorial division of power can constrain over-centralisation. Germany’s postwar federal order disperses authority vertically between the federation and the Länder, while the United States established a federal union that made a stronger national government compatible with the continued political authority of individual states.
Central Argument
The collective experience of these six democracies shows that decentralisation can make state unity more compatible with diversity. Minority or regionally distinct communities such as French-speaking Quebecers, Basque and Catalan nationalists, Scottish and Welsh voters, or unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland can pursue self-government and protect core interests without treating control of the national government as the only route to political security.
Decentralisation has supported peace and democratic resilience in these cases not by removing disagreement, but by institutionalising it. Federal and devolved structures provide representative arenas in which identity, resources, language, rights, and constitutional status can be negotiated through law, elections, and intergovernmental bargaining rather than violence or unilateral coercion.
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Syria: From Centralisation to Decentralisation
Implications for Peacebuilding, Democratic Governance, Human Rights, and Regional Security
Abstract
This study examines how governance structures in Syria have shaped outcomes in peacebuilding, democracy, human rights, and regional security before and after the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime. It compares centralised governance under Assad and post 2024 Hay’at Tahrir al Sham authority with decentralised governance models, including the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (which, following the 29 January 2026 agreement, was reduced to a form of local administration), the emerging self governance in al Suwayda, and federalist claims within Alawite coastal communities.
Using comparative process tracing and critical discourse analysis, the study draws on 100 texts (2010–2026), ACLED data, UN and human rights reports, and interviews and stakeholder discussions conducted in 2026.
The central argument is that decentralisation, when grounded in local citizen consent and inclusive political recognition, enhances legitimacy, stability, and human rights protection. Conversely, exclusionary or ideologically imposed centralisation produces legitimacy deficits, leading to instability, repression, and conflict.
1. Introduction: Mapping Syia’s Fragmented Political Landscap
A map of Syria is essential for understanding the spatial distribution of competing governance models, including:
Assad centralised state structures
Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controlled governance zones
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)
Druze self governance in al Suwayda
Emerging Alawite federalist claims in coastal regions
At the time of writing, Syria was not a unitary political space but a fragmented legitimacy environment in which multiple governance systems competed for authority over territory and populations. Although HTS controlled the capital, Damascus in December 2024, the AANES and Suwayda remained outside its control.
2. Theoretical Framework: Legitimacy, Power, and the Postmodern Stat
2.1 Classical Foundation: Weberian Authority
The starting point is the classical definition of the state:
A state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory
(Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77–78)
Weber provides a structural account of legitimacy grounded in authority and territorial control. However, this framework assumes a relatively stable relationship between ruler and ruled.
2.2 Postmodern Critique: Foucault and the Decentralisation of Power
Building on Weber, Michel Foucault fundamentally challenges the idea that legitimacy is centralised or state-bound.
For Foucault:
Power is not held exclusively by the state
Power is dispersed through institutions, discourse, and everyday practices
Legitimacy is produced through knowledge systems and disciplinary mechanisms, not just sovereignty
This is particularly relevant in Syria, where:
Competing authorities construct competing “truths” about governance
Legitimacy is produced locally through people’s lived experiences of security, exposure to violence, quality of governance, and living standards.
Thus, legitimacy becomes decentralised, relational, and continuously produced, not institutionally guaranteed.
2.3 Rancière: The Political as the “Distribution of the Sensible”
Complementing Foucault, Jacques Rancière offers a framework of political legitimacy grounded in participation and visibility.
Rancière argues that politics occurs when those without formal power assert their presence within the political order.
Applied to Syria:
Communities such as Kurds, Druze, and Alawites challenge their exclusion from the “official” political order.
Governance legitimacy depends on whether populations are recognised as political subjects
This reinforces a core argument of this study:
Without the inclusion of citizens and communities, legitimacy cannot exist.
2.4 Core Analytical Proposition: Consent as the Foundation of Legitimacy
This study advances a central proposition:
Legitimacy is not produced by sovereignty alone, but by continuous citizen consent.
Where consent is absent:
Legitimacy collapses
Governance becomes coercive
Conflict and instability increase
Democratic participation erodes
This applies equally to centralised and decentralised systems.
3. Methodology
The study uses:
Comparative process tracing
Critical discourse analysis of 100 texts (2010–2026):
ACLED conflict data
UN and human rights reports
15 expert interviews
4 stakeholder group discussions (2026)
4. Empirical Analysis: Governance Models in Syria
4.1 Assad Centralisation
Highly centralised Arab nationalist system
Stability achieved through coercion rather than consent
Systematic human rights violations
Weak inclusion of plural identities
Result:
Apparent order but structurally unstable legitimacy
4.2 HTS Governance Model
Islamist governance framework
Denial of democratic pluralism
Reports of violence against minorities
Attempts at controlled institutional legitimacy
Result:
Ideological centralisation without consent, producing acute legitimacy deficits
4.3 AANES Model
Decentralised multi ethnic governance
Inclusion of Kurds, Arabs, and Syriacs, including Muslims, Christians, Yezidis, and Alawites
Relative stability under conflict conditions
Emphasis on gender participation and local councils
Result:
Legitimacy grounded in partial consent and participation.
Following HTS’s military incursion into areas administered by the AANES and the 29 Agreement between the HTS authorities and the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the AANES was effectively dismantled. The Kurds, however, retained a form of local administration in the majority-Kurdish areas of Hasakah and Kobani. The status of other majrity Kurdish areas, including Afrin, Sêrekaniyê, Girê Spî, and others, remained unresolved at the time of writing.
4.4 Suwayda and Druze Self Governance
Emerging hybrid civil armed governance
Strong local identity based legitimacy
Divided preferences: independence vs federalism
Result:
Legitimacy rooted in local consent rather than state authority
4.5 Alawite Coastal Mobilisation
Increasing calls for federalism
Reaction to perceived exclusion and violence
Limited political articulation due to repression
Indicative findings
Legitimacy crisis emerging from insecurity and lack of representation
5. Key Comparative Insight: Consent and Legitimacy
Centralised governance in Syria demonstrates:
Imposed identity structures
Weak citizen consent
Recurring cycles of conflict
Decentralised governance models show:
Higher participation
Stronger local legitimacy
More stable governance outcomes under conflict conditions
6. Core Argument
This study argues:
Without the inclusion of citizens and communities, there is no legitimacy.
And further:
Where legitimacy is absent → governance becomes coercive
Where coercion dominates → tension and conflict emerge
Where conflict emerges → democracy and peace deteriorate
This applies equally to:
Assad centralisation
HTS governance
External intervention models
7. Conclusion
Legitimacy is not a static property of the state but a continuous process of recognition, participation, and consent.
From a combined Weberian, Foucauldian, and Rancièrian perspective:
Weber explains structural authority
Foucault reveals dispersed power and discourse
Rancière highlights political inclusion and visibility
Together, they demonstrate that:
Stability in Syria depends not on sovereignty alone, but on whether governance is continually legitimised through the consent and participation of its ethnic and religious communities.
Centralisation without consent produces instability.
Decentralisation grounded in citizen legitimacy offers a more viable pathway toward peace, inclusion, and regional security.