The Decentralisation Program

for Peace and Democracy

 

 

 

 

D

P

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This section presents selected comparative research on decentralisation, federalism, and power-sharing across diverse political contexts. It highlights how institutional design, territorial governance, and power distribution can contribute to conflict prevention, democratic stability, and long-term peace.

 

Switzerland

 

Themes

Federalism, consociational governance, multilingual accommodation, conflict prevention

 

Key Sources

Swiss Federal Constitution (official framework of federalism)

Swiss Federal Council - Governance and Federalism documentation

Armingeon, Klaus (ed.), Swiss Federalism: The Transformation of a Political System (Palgrave Macmillan)

Vatter, Adrian, Federalism in Switzerland (Oxford University Press)

OECD Territorial Reviews: Switzerland (OECD Publishing)

 

Relevance

Switzerland is widely regarded as a stable federal system managing deep linguistic and religious diversity through strong cantonal autonomy and consensus-based governance.

 

Canada

 

Themes

Federalism, multinational governance, Indigenous self-government, Quebec autonomy

 

Key Sources

Government of Canada - Federalism and Constitutional Structure

Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples

OECD, Territorial Reviews: Canada

Watts, Ronald L., Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queen’s University Press)

Cairns, Alan C., Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State

 

Relevance

Canada demonstrates how federalism and constitutional flexibility can manage linguistic diversity (Quebec) and ongoing Indigenous self-government claims.

 

Spain

 

Themes

State of Autonomies, regional nationalism, asymmetric decentralisation

 

Key Sources

Spanish Constitution of 1978 (Estado de las Autonomías framework)

Colino, César, The Spanish State of Autonomies

Keating, Michael, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereign Era (Oxford University Press)

Generalitat de Catalunya institutional publications (regional governance analysis)

Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) policy papers on territorial conflict

 

Relevance

Spain provides a key example of asymmetric decentralisation used to manage Basque and Catalan nationalist tensions within a unitary constitutional state.

 

United Kingdom

 

Themes

Devolution, peacebuilding, asymmetric governance, constitutional adaptation

 

Key Sources

UK Government - Devolution Agreements (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland)

The Belfast / Good Friday Agreement (1998)

Constitution Unit, University College London (UCL)

McGarry, John & O’Leary, Brendan, The Northern Ireland Conflict and Power-Sharing

Northern Ireland Office publications on peace implementation

 

Relevance

The UK demonstrates how devolution and institutional power-sharing contributed to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and ongoing territorial accommodation.

 

Germany

 

Themes

Federalism, post-war constitutional design, democratic stability

 

Key Sources

Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz)

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education)

Bundesrat (Federal Council) documentation on federal governance

Jeffery, Charlie, German Federalism Today

Oxford University Press, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany

 

Relevance

Germany’s federal system was deliberately designed after WWII to prevent centralisation of power and safeguard democratic stability.

 

United States

 

Themes

Constitutional federalism, state autonomy, multilevel governance

 

Key Sources

U.S. Constitution (Articles I–VII; Tenth Amendment)

Congressional Research Service (CRS), Federalism and the U.S. System of Government

Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Federalism

Brookings Institution research on U.S. federalism

Council of State Governments (CSG) publications

 

Relevance

The U.S. is a foundational model of constitutional federalism balancing strong state governments with a central federal authority.

 

United Arab Emirates

 

Themes

Federal monarchy, executive federalism, emirate autonomy

 

Key Sources

UAE Constitution (1971)

Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR)

Gulf Research Center publications on governance structures

Hertog, Steffen, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (comparative Gulf governance analysis)

 

Relevance

The UAE represents a unique hybrid federal system combining strong central authority with significant autonomy for individual emirates.

 

Bosnia and Herzegovina

 

Themes

Post-conflict governance, Dayton Agreement, consociationalism

Key Sources

Dayton Peace Agreement (1995)

Office of the High Representative (OHR), Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bose, Sumantra, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention

International Crisis Group reports on Bosnia governance

European Stability Initiative (ESI) analysis on institutional fragmentation

 

Relevance

Bosnia is a key example of externally designed power-sharing arrangements aimed at ending violent ethnic conflict.

 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

 

Themes

Regional autonomy, federal Iraq, post-conflict governance

 

Key Sources

Constitution of Iraq (2005), Article 117–121 on federalism

World Bank reports on governance and decentralisation in Iraq

Middle East Research Institute (MERI) policy studies

Natali, Denise, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq

International Crisis Group reports on Iraq and Kurdish governance

 

Relevance

The Kurdistan Region represents one of the most advanced cases of regional autonomy within a fragile federal state in the Middle East.

 

Additional Comparative Cases (Selected)

 

Belgium

Deschouwer, Kris, The Politics of Belgium

OECD Territorial Reviews: Belgium

 

India

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs – federal structure documents

Stepan, Alfred, Federalism and Democracy in India

 

South Africa

Constitution of South Africa (1996)

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) reports

 

Ethiopia

Constitution of Ethiopia (1995)

International Crisis Group reports on ethnic federalism

 

Nigeria

Constitution of Nigeria (1999)

World Bank governance and decentralisation reports

 

Foundational Comparative Literature

 

Watts, Ronald L., Comparing Federal Systems (McGill-Queen’s University Press)

Elazar, Daniel J., Exploring Federalism

O’Leary, Brendan, Debating Consociational Politics

Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies

World Bank, Decentralization and Subnational Governance Reports

OECD, Territorial Governance and Regional Development Reports

Comparative Lessons on Decentralisation, Peace & Democracy

The Architecture of Autonomy: How Decentralisation Supports Peace and Democracy 

In the countries examined here, decentralisation has supported peace and democratic stability by accommodating territorial, linguistic, religious, political, and economic diversity within a shared system of governance. Switzerland, Spain, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States developed distinct systems of federalism or devolution in response to specific historical tensions. These included ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions, competing national identities, regional demands for self-government, economic and fiscal interests, distrust of centralised authority, and the need to prevent the concentration of power under authoritarian rule.

 

By giving regions meaningful authority while preserving common national institutions, these arrangements have created democratic channels for resolving disputes that might otherwise become zero-sum struggles over control of the state. Their experience shows how self-rule and shared rule can make political unity compatible with diversity, representation, and peaceful contestation, while also laying the foundations for progressive democratic institutions. 

Distinct Models of Territorial Governance

Switzerland combines federalism, strong cantonal and municipal authority, and extensive direct democracy. Its 1848 federal settlement followed the Sonderbund War between Catholic and Protestant cantons and created a stronger common state while retaining important cantonal autonomy. Cantonal representation in federal institutions and the double-majority requirement for constitutional amendments have helped protect territorially concentrated minorities, especially across linguistic and religious divisions.

 

Spain is formally a unitary state but has developed extensive regional self-government through the post-1978 State of Autonomies. Its asymmetric framework accommodates historically distinct communities, notably the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia, while preserving a single Spanish sovereignty. Basque autonomy is especially extensive, including the Concierto Económico fiscal arrangement and a regional police force. These institutions widened democratic channels for territorial demands after Francoism, although they did not independently end ETA’s armed campaign and have not resolved conflict over Catalan self-determination.

 

Canada is a federation in which provinces possess substantial constitutional authority over areas such as education, health administration, property and civil rights, and natural-resource management. This framework has enabled Quebec to preserve French-language institutions and its civil-law tradition within Canada. Federalism has helped manage Quebec sovereignty claims through elections, referendums, and constitutional debate, though it has not ended disputes over Quebec’s political status.

 

The United States is a federal system in which states retain significant constitutionally protected authority while remaining subject to the federal Constitution and federal law. Federalism helped unite former colonies that were wary of concentrated central authority. State governments continue to provide regional representation and opportunities for policy experimentation. However, American federalism has also generated conflicts over rights and inequality. It has also produced ongoing tensions over the distribution of power between the federal and state governments.

 

Germany is a constitutional federation in which the Länder participate in federal legislation through the Bundesrat. Federalism was entrenched after the Second World War as part of a wider constitutional settlement intended to disperse power and prevent renewed authoritarian centralisation. Germany’s cooperative federal system requires continual negotiation between federal and Länder governments, combining common national standards with strong regional participation in their formation and implementation.

 

The United Kingdom is a legally unitary state with asymmetric devolution. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have different legislative and executive powers, while Westminster retains parliamentary sovereignty. In Northern Ireland, devolved power-sharing is a central element of the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Alongside consent, British-Irish cooperation, North-South institutions, and rights protections, devolved government has provided a framework for managing unionist-nationalist conflict through democratic politics rather than violence. 

 

Decentralisation as Conflict Management

 

Decentralisation has enabled territorially concentrated communities to protect important aspects of public life without needing to secure permanent control of the national government. It can therefore reduce the winner-takes-all character of centralised politics.

 

In Switzerland, federalism transformed a conflict between Catholic and Protestant cantons into a constitutional framework that balanced national unity with cantonal self-government. In Canada, provincial powers and Quebec’s distinct linguistic and legal institutions have contained sovereignty claims within democratic processes. In Spain, regional autonomy created representative institutions through which Basque and Catalan demands could be expressed, even though major constitutional and political disagreements remain. In Northern Ireland, power-sharing devolution has offered unionist and nationalist parties a structured means of sharing authority within a wider peace settlement.

 

The German and American cases show a related but distinct function: territorial division of power can constrain over-centralisation. Germany’s postwar federal order disperses authority vertically between the federation and the Länder, while the United States established a federal union that made a stronger national government compatible with the continued political authority of individual states.

 

Central Argument

The collective experience of these six democracies shows that decentralisation can make state unity more compatible with diversity. Minority or regionally distinct communities such as French-speaking Quebecers, Basque and Catalan nationalists, Scottish and Welsh voters, or unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland can pursue self-government and protect core interests without treating control of the national government as the only route to political security.

 

Decentralisation has supported peace and democratic resilience in these cases not by removing disagreement, but by institutionalising it. Federal and devolved structures provide representative arenas in which identity, resources, language, rights, and constitutional status can be negotiated through law, elections, and intergovernmental bargaining rather than violence or unilateral coercion.

 

Bibliography

 

Bogdanor, Vernon. Devolution in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

 

Ghai, Yash. Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

 

Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

 

Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.

 

Linder, Wolf. Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 2010.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. London: Routledge, 1993. 

 

Sisk, Timothy D. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

 

Stepan, Alfred. “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model.” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (1999): 19–34.

 

Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity. 5th ed. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011.

 

Watts, Ronald L. Comparing Federal Systems. 3rd ed. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008.

 

Syria: From Centralisation to Decentralisation

Implications for Peacebuilding, Democratic Governance, Human Rights, and Regional Security

 

 

 

Abstract

 

This study examines how governance structures in Syria have shaped outcomes in peacebuilding, democracy, human rights, and regional security before and after the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime. It compares centralised governance under Assad and post 2024 Hay’at Tahrir al Sham authority with decentralised governance models, including the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (which, following the 29 January 2026 agreement, was reduced to a form of local administration), the emerging self governance in al Suwayda, and federalist claims within Alawite coastal communities.

 

 

Using comparative process tracing and critical discourse analysis, the study draws on 100 texts (2010–2026), ACLED data, UN and human rights reports, and interviews and stakeholder discussions conducted in 2026.

 

 

The central argument is that decentralisation, when grounded in local citizen consent and inclusive political recognition, enhances legitimacy, stability, and human rights protection. Conversely, exclusionary or ideologically imposed centralisation produces legitimacy deficits, leading to instability, repression, and conflict.

 

 

 

1. Introduction: Mapping Syia’s Fragmented Political Landscap

A map of Syria is essential for understanding the spatial distribution of competing governance models, including:

 

 

Assad centralised state structures

 

 

Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controlled governance zones

 

 

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)

 

 

Druze self governance in al Suwayda

 

 

Emerging Alawite federalist claims in coastal regions

 

 

At the time of writing, Syria was not a unitary political space but a fragmented legitimacy environment in which multiple governance systems competed for authority over territory and populations. Although HTS controlled the capital, Damascus in December 2024, the AANES and Suwayda remained outside its control. 

 

 

 

2. Theoretical Framework: Legitimacy, Power, and the Postmodern Stat

 

 

2.1 Classical Foundation: Weberian Authority

 

 

The starting point is the classical definition of the state:

 

 

A state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory

 

 

(Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, pp. 77–78)

 

 

Weber provides a structural account of legitimacy grounded in authority and territorial control. However, this framework assumes a relatively stable relationship between ruler and ruled.

 

 

 

2.2 Postmodern Critique: Foucault and the Decentralisation of Power

 

 

Building on Weber, Michel Foucault fundamentally challenges the idea that legitimacy is centralised or state-bound.

 

 

For Foucault:

 

 

Power is not held exclusively by the state

 

 

Power is dispersed through institutions, discourse, and everyday practices

 

 

Legitimacy is produced through knowledge systems and disciplinary mechanisms, not just sovereignty

 

 

This is particularly relevant in Syria, where:

 

 

Competing authorities construct competing “truths” about governance

 

 

Legitimacy is produced locally through people’s lived experiences of security, exposure to violence, quality of governance, and living standards.

 

 

Thus, legitimacy becomes decentralised, relational, and continuously produced, not institutionally guaranteed.

 

 

2.3 Rancière: The Political as the “Distribution of the Sensible”

 

 

Complementing Foucault, Jacques Rancière offers a framework of political legitimacy grounded in participation and visibility.

 

 

Rancière argues that politics occurs when those without formal power assert their presence within the political order.

 

 

Applied to Syria:

 

 

Communities such as Kurds, Druze, and Alawites challenge their exclusion from the “official” political order. 

 

 

Governance legitimacy depends on whether populations are recognised as political subjects

 

 

This reinforces a core argument of this study:

 

 

Without the inclusion of citizens and communities, legitimacy cannot exist.

 

 

2.4 Core Analytical Proposition: Consent as the Foundation of Legitimacy

 

 

This study advances a central proposition:

 

 

Legitimacy is not produced by sovereignty alone, but by continuous citizen consent.

 

 

Where consent is absent:

 

 

Legitimacy collapses

 

 

Governance becomes coercive

 

 

Conflict and instability increase

 

 

Democratic participation erodes

 

 

This applies equally to centralised and decentralised systems.

 

 

3. Methodology

 

 

The study uses:

 

 

Comparative process tracing

 

 

Critical discourse analysis of 100 texts (2010–2026): 

 

 

ACLED conflict data

 

 

UN and human rights reports

 

 

15 expert interviews

 

 

4 stakeholder group discussions (2026)

 

 

 

4. Empirical Analysis: Governance Models in Syria

 

 

4.1 Assad Centralisation

 

 

Highly centralised Arab nationalist system

 

 

Stability achieved through coercion rather than consent

 

 

Systematic human rights violations

 

 

Weak inclusion of plural identities

 

 

Result:

 

 

Apparent order but structurally unstable legitimacy

 

 

 

4.2 HTS Governance Model

 

 

Islamist governance framework

 

 

Denial of democratic pluralism

 

 

Reports of violence against minorities

 

 

Attempts at controlled institutional legitimacy

 

 

Result:

 

 

Ideological centralisation without consent, producing acute legitimacy deficits

 

 

 

4.3 AANES Model 

 

 

Decentralised multi ethnic governance

 

 

Inclusion of Kurds, Arabs, and Syriacs, including Muslims, Christians, Yezidis, and Alawites

 

 

Relative stability under conflict conditions

 

 

Emphasis on gender participation and local councils

 

 

Result:

 

 

Legitimacy grounded in partial consent and participation. 

 

 

Following HTS’s military incursion into areas administered by the AANES and the 29 Agreement between the HTS authorities and the leadership of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the AANES was effectively dismantled. The Kurds, however, retained a form of local administration in the majority-Kurdish areas of Hasakah and Kobani. The status of other majrity Kurdish areas, including Afrin, Sêrekaniyê, Girê Spî, and others, remained unresolved at the time of writing. 

 

 

4.4 Suwayda and Druze Self Governance

 

 

Emerging hybrid civil armed governance

 

 

Strong local identity based legitimacy

 

 

Divided preferences: independence vs federalism

 

 

Result:

 

 

Legitimacy rooted in local consent rather than state authority

 

 

 

4.5 Alawite Coastal Mobilisation

 

 

Increasing calls for federalism

 

 

Reaction to perceived exclusion and violence

 

 

Limited political articulation due to repression

 

 

Indicative findings 

 

Legitimacy crisis emerging from insecurity and lack of representation

 

 

5. Key Comparative Insight: Consent and Legitimacy

 

 

Centralised governance in Syria demonstrates:

 

 

Imposed identity structures

 

 

Weak citizen consent

 

 

Recurring cycles of conflict

 

 

Decentralised governance models show:

 

 

Higher participation

 

 

Stronger local legitimacy

 

 

More stable governance outcomes under conflict conditions

 

 

 

6. Core Argument

 

 

This study argues:

 

 

Without the inclusion of citizens and communities, there is no legitimacy.

 

 

And further:

 

 

Where legitimacy is absent → governance becomes coercive

 

 

Where coercion dominates → tension and conflict emerge

 

 

Where conflict emerges → democracy and peace deteriorate

 

 

This applies equally to:

 

 

Assad centralisation

 

 

HTS governance

 

 

External intervention models

 

 

7. Conclusion

 

 

Legitimacy is not a static property of the state but a continuous process of recognition, participation, and consent.

 

 

From a combined Weberian, Foucauldian, and Rancièrian perspective:

 

 

Weber explains structural authority

 

 

Foucault reveals dispersed power and discourse

 

 

Rancière highlights political inclusion and visibility

 

 

Together, they demonstrate that:

 

 

Stability in Syria depends not on sovereignty alone, but on whether governance is continually legitimised through the consent and participation of its ethnic and religious communities. 

 

Centralisation without consent produces instability.

 

 

Decentralisation grounded in citizen legitimacy offers a more viable pathway toward peace, inclusion, and regional security.